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Abstract
International tax competition is generally framed as states competing for foreign direct invest-
ment (FDI), and analyses of the phenomenon draw heavily on FDI statistics. In and of themselves, 
however, FDI statistics are merely a quantification of the value of investment projects and tell us 
little about the heterogeneity of these projects and the distinct patterns of competitive dynamics 
between countries they generate. In this paper, we create a more sophisticated understanding 
of international tax competition by pointing out its variegated nature. To do so, we introduce 
the notion of the “great fragmentation of the firm” to distinguish between five categories of FDI: 
manufacturing affiliates, shared service centers, research and development facilities, intermedi-
ate holding companies, and top holding companies. Using a novel combination of firm-level and 
country-level data, we identify for each category of FDI which European Union member states 
are most successful in attracting it, what macro-institutional and tax arrangements they rely on 
for doing so, and what benefits they receive from it in terms of tax revenues and employment 
creation. In this way we were able to identify five distinct FDI attraction profiles and show that, 
rather than being a game of all against all, tax competition in the European Union increasingly 
takes place amongst subsets of countries that compete for similar categories of FDI.
Keywords: foreign direct investment (FDI), FDI attraction profiles, global value chains, global 
wealth chains, great fragmentation, tax competition, transnational corporations (TNC)
Zusammenfassung
Der internationale Steuerwettbewerb wird üblicherweise als ein Wettbewerb zwischen Staaten um 
ausländische Direktinvestitionen (foreign direct investment, FDI) dargestellt. Analysen zu diesem 
Thema stützen sich weitgehend auf FDI-Statistiken, die jedoch ausschließlich den zahlenmäßigen 
Wert von Investitionsprojekten beschreiben. Sie besagen daher wenig über die Heterogenität die-
ser Projekte und die durch sie erzeugten distinkten Muster wettbewerblicher Dynamik zwischen 
Ländern. Mit diesem Papier möchten wir zu einem differenzierteren Verständnis des internatio-
nalen Steuerwettbewerbs beitragen, indem wir dessen vielfältige Erscheinungsformen aufzeigen. 
Hierzu führen wir den Begriff der „großen Fragmentierung des Unternehmens“ (great fragmen-
tation) ein, um zwischen fünf FDI-Kategorien zu unterscheiden: Produktionsstandorte, Shared 
Service Centers, Forschungs- und Entwicklungszentren, Zwischenholdings und Dachholdings. 
Durch eine neuartige Kombination von Unternehmens- und Länderdaten ermitteln wir für jede 
dieser Kategorien, welche EU-Mitgliedstaaten am erfolgreichsten ausländische Direktinvestitio-
nen darin anwerben, auf welche makroinstitutionellen und steuerlichen Arrangements sie sich 
hierbei stützen und welchen Nutzen im Hinblick auf Steuererträge und neu geschaffene Arbeits-
plätze sie hieraus ziehen. Auf diese Weise können wir fünf verschiedene FDI-Attraktivitätsprofile 
erarbeiten und zeigen, dass der Steuerwettbewerb zwischen den Staaten der Europäischen Union 
nicht etwa ein Spiel ist, in dem alle gegen alle antreten, sondern dass er zunehmend zwischen Un-
tergruppen von Staaten stattfindet, die in ähnlichen FDI-Kategorien miteinander konkurrieren.
Schlagwörter: ausländische Direktinvestitionen (FDI), FDI-Attraktivitätsprofile, globale Vermö-
gensketten, globale Wertschöpfungsketten, große Fragmentierung, multinationale Unternehmen, 
Steuerwettbewerb
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Competing with Whom? European Tax Competition,  
the “Great Fragmentation of the Firm,” and Varieties of  
FDI Attraction Profiles
1 Introduction
An important feature of post-war economic globalization is the dramatic expansion of 
global foreign direct investment (FDI). Annual flows of global FDI expanded from 205 
billion dollars in 1990 to 1.4 trillion dollars in 2017 (UNCTAD 2018). The worldwide 
stock of FDI had expanded accordingly. Whereas in 1990 it stood at 2.2 trillion dollars, 
in 2017 this figure has risen to 31.5 trillion dollars (UNCTAD 2018). Countries, want-
ing to share in the gains to be had from the growing pie of global FDI, compete with 
one another to attract cross-border investments made by transnational corporations 
(TNCs).1 Motivated by the anticipated benefits from incoming FDI, which include both 
concrete short-term benefits, such as increased tax revenues, growing employment, and 
GDP growth, as well as more intangible, long-term ones, such as knowledge spillover 
effects, productivity gains, and a reduction of current account deficits, national govern-
ments and economic policy-makers have become increasingly preoccupied with im-
proving their countries’ investment climates and preserving the competitiveness of their 
national economies (Genschel and Seelkopf 2015). Although governments and national 
policy-makers have a wide range of policy instruments at their disposal to increase 
the attractiveness of their countries’ investment climates, they have increasingly come 
to rely on tax incentives, especially when the countries share similar levels of human 
capital, infrastructure, and other macro-institutional features. The global proliferation 
of tax incentives has led scholars, intergovernmental organizations, and civil society 
groups to warn against the negative consequences of a looming global tax race to the 
bottom (OECD 2013; Genschel, Kemmerling, and Seils 2011).
Over the last decades a rich body of literature has emerged on the phenomenon of 
international tax competition. This literature has significantly pushed forward our un-
derstanding of the institutional constraints governments face when engaging in inter-
This project has received funding from the European Research Council (ERC) under the European 
Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme (grant agreement number 638946). We 
thank Saila Stausholm for providing the data on the number of employees at the Big Four accounting 
firms. We also thank Milan Babic and the other members of the CORPNET research group, as well 
as Benjamin Braun, Sandy Hager, Bruno Casella, Richard Bolwijn, Marina Hübner, and Lukas Arndt 
for useful suggestions and comments.
1 TNCs have become dominant players in today’s global economy. The United Nations Confer-
ence on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) estimated that TNCs, through their operations 
both at home and abroad, generated value added of approximately 16 trillion dollars in 2010 
– about a quarter of total world GDP (UNCTAD 2011), and that 80 percent of global trade oc-
curred within global value chains controlled by TNCs (UNCTAD 2013).
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national tax competition (Blonigen 2005; Genschel, Kemmerling, and Seils 2011; Rixen 
2011; Arel-Bundock 2017; Jensen, Malesky, and Walsh 2015; Li 2006) as well as the 
implications of international tax competition for national tax policy autonomy (Swank 
and Steinmo 2002; Palan 2002). Surprisingly, however, this literature has not developed 
a sophisticated understanding of the actual structure and dynamics of international tax 
competition itself. That is to say, no convincing answers have been provided to the ques-
tions: Who competes with whom? For what? And how?
Conventional understandings of tax competition conceive of the phenomenon as a 
monolithic force that pulls countries into a race of all against all, or, alternatively, as 
one that pits small countries against big ones (Devereux, Griffith, and Klemm 2002; 
Genschel and Schwarz 2011). In line with such understandings, attempts to uncover 
the structure and dynamics of international tax competition typically study inward FDI 
statistics (Gropp and Kostial 2000; Bellak and Leibrecht 2009; de Mooij and Ederveen 
2003, 2008; Li 2006). We argue that such an approach is problematic for two reasons. 
First, FDI statistics represent financing flows, not necessarily investment in new pro-
ductive assets. More than 50 percent of the value of FDI flows represents a transfer of 
ownership of existing assets (M&As). This figure can be as high as 70–90 percent for 
countries such as the Netherlands, Switzerland, and Luxembourg (see Figure S1 in the 
online Appendix). Distinguishing between greenfield FDI, where new operations are 
established, and brownfield FDI, where existing assets and operations are leased, li-
censed, or acquired, is key to understanding the dynamics of tax competition.
The second problem with using FDI statistics to study the structure and dynamics of 
international tax competition is that FDI statistics are merely a quantification of the 
value of TNCs’ investment projects in different countries. They tell us very little about 
the character of the actual investment projects. Previous research has identified differ-
ent strategies that may motivate firms to make foreign investments – the most common 
distinction being the one between horizontal and vertical FDI2 (Beugelsdijk, Smeets, 
and Zwinkels 2008) – but has not explicitly distinguished the different types of activi-
ties that are financed by those investments. These are important shortcomings because 
the actual investment projects that are financed by these financial flows are extremely 
heterogeneous, and both the benefits that countries can expect to reap from them and 
the macro-institutional features required to attract such investments vary considerably 
from one type of investment project to another.
In this paper we challenge conventional monolithic understandings of international 
tax competition by showing that, empirically, tax competition appears as a much more 
variegated phenomenon. Increasingly, as firms unbundle their operations and disperse 
them across national borders, governments create targeted tax incentives, typically de-
2 Horizontal FDI refers to situations in which TNCs duplicate specific operations in different 
countries. Vertical FDI, on the other hand, occurs when a TNC invests abroad in production 
processes up or down the production chain of specific goods or services.
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signed around the macro-institutional endowments of national (and regional) econo-
mies, which tend to attract specific categories of global FDI. Although in some cases 
these categories pertain to specific industries (e. g., the automobile industry in Eastern 
Europe, IT firms in Ireland), increasingly they concern specific corporate functions 
that are practiced across industries (e. g., manufacturing activities, business services, 
R&D, and the holding and control of corporate assets). This has important implications 
for the way in which tax competition between countries plays out and the patterns of 
competitive dynamics it generates. When Cyprus, in 2013, introduced one of the most 
generous tax incentives for R&D activities that currently exists in the European Union 
(Evers, Miller, and Spengel 2015), it was most likely not to compete for manufacturing 
activities with Poland, but to compete for TNCs’ R&D activities with countries such as 
Malta, Hungary, and the Netherlands. Rather than being a game of all against all, tax 
competition thus increasingly takes place amongst subsets of countries that compete for 
the same categories of FDI.
We provide empirical evidence for our claim by combining firm-level and country-level 
data to expose the patterns of competitive dynamics in the race for FDI in the European 
Union (EU). Specifically, we (I) identify the different categories of FDI that EU member 
states attract, (II) discern possible employment and tax benefits they receive from do-
ing so, and (III) pinpoint the tax incentives and macro-institutional features associated 
with hosting these different categories of FDI. To do so, we conduct a country-level 
analysis in which we examine which subsets of countries compete for the following 
categories of FDI: manufacturing affiliates, shared service centers, R&D facilities, top 
holding companies, and intermediate holding companies. We conclude by profiling 
countries according to the specific combinations of categories of FDI that they attract. 
This prompted us to identify five, what we call, FDI attraction profiles: manufacturing 
centers, back-office centers, innovation centers, coordination centers, and profit centers.
The paper proceeds as follows. The following two sections develop the theoretical and 
analytical framework that underpins the empirical analysis presented in the second part 
of the paper. Section two introduces the notion of the “great fragmentation of the firm” 
to capture the fundamental restructuring over the last couple of decades of the orga-
nizational and legal design of the large internationally operating firm. Section three 
then provides a schematic depiction of the anatomy and geographical dispersion of the 
contemporary firm. Specifically, it distinguishes between five different types of group 
subsidiaries, which correspond to five different categories of FDI. The paper then turns 
to the empirical analysis. Section four details the analytical approach and discusses the 
data used for the analysis. Subsequently, Section five presents the results of the analysis. 
Finally, Section six concludes by suggesting some of the implications of these results for 
policy-making and further research.
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2 The great fragmentation of the firm
The impressive expansion of global FDI in recent decades has been a symptom of a fun-
damental reorganization of the architecture of TNCs during this period. This reorga-
nization, we propose, is best understood in terms of a fragmentation and geographical 
dispersion of TNCs’ operational activities and legal–financial structure, a phenomenon 
we will refer to as the great fragmentation of the firm.
Conceptually, the great fragmentation of the firm can be thought of as transpiring on 
two levels of corporate organization. At the operational level, the notion of the great 
fragmentation of the firm captures the unbundling and geographical dispersion of 
TNCs’ operational activities. This level of the great fragmentation has been well-doc-
umented in the international business and management literature as well as the po-
litical economy literature on global value chains and global production networks. This 
body of literature discusses how, driven by growing demands to maximize shareholder 
value, and facilitated by advances in information and communication technology (ICT) 
and gradual reductions in trade and investment barriers, from the 1980s onwards large 
firms increasingly began to unbundle, outsource, and relocate part of their operational 
activities offshore. Over time, these processes have resulted in the emergence of global 
value chains through which large TNCs, so-called lead firms, organize and coordinate 
their productive operations across geographies (Gereffi, Humphrey, and Sturgeon 2005; 
Coe, Dicken, and Hess 2008). Most salient in this regard, both politically and in terms 
of scholarly interest, has been the relocation of TNCs’ manufacturing activities to low 
labor-cost countries (Blinder 2006).
However, the offshoring of operational activities has not been confined to manufactur-
ing activities. Since the second half of the 1990s, TNCs have increasingly been unbun-
dling, outsourcing, and offshoring business support services as well (McIvor 2010). The 
offshoring of business support services has involved not only back-office and support 
operations, such as human resource management, legal services, and accounting (Wil-
son 1995), but also front-office operations such as customer support (Breathnach 2000) 
and even research and development activities (Dachs, Stehrer, and Zahradnik 2014). As 
of recently, the unbundling and geographical dispersion of TNCs’ operational activities 
has also come to affect those functions that traditionally were combined in the TNC’s 
global corporate headquarter (Desai 2009). For example, TNCs’ global treasury and 
financing function might be separated from other headquarter functions to be per-
formed by a separate legal entity operating from a jurisdiction that provides the opti-
mal institutional environment for the performance of that specific function. Similarly, 
strategic management might be offshored to jurisdictions that provide large pools of 
managerial talent and that are conveniently located in the proximity of major markets.
At the legal–financial level of corporate organization, the great fragmentation of the firm 
involves processes of legal restructuring and financial innovation that enable firms to 
more efficiently capture the value created by their globalized operational activities. This 
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dimension of the great fragmentation is currently being explored in the emerging litera-
ture on global wealth chains (Seabrooke and Wigan 2017; Bryan, Rafferty, and Wigan 
2017). Based on our reading of this literature, we distinguish three important features of 
the rethinking of the legal–financial organization of the corporate group. A first feature 
has been the interposition of (intermediate) holding companies in group ownership 
structures. These are companies that engage in narrowly defined activities such as the 
holding of equity or debt stakes in group subsidiaries or the holding of rights to the 
(sub)licensing of intellectual property. The use of holding companies has increased sig-
nificantly since the 1990s. For example, assets held by intermediate holding companies 
in the Netherlands increased from under 1.8 trillion euros in 2006 to 3.8 trillion euros 
in 2015.3 Also, assets held by intermediate holdings of German-owned firms increased 
by 1400 percent from 1989 to 2001 (Weichenrieder, Mintz, et al. 2008).
A second feature has been the rearrangements of important value-creating assets, es-
pecially intellectual property such as copyrights, patents, and trademarks, across group 
subsidiaries. Through intragroup transactions and cost-contribution agreements,4 
either intellectual property assets themselves, or (parts of) the rights to the income 
streams generated by those assets are transferred to group holding companies estab-
lished especially for the purpose of holding those assets.
A third feature concerns innovative approaches to intragroup financing arrangements, 
often supporting a strategy called “earnings stripping.” In the case of earnings strip-
ping, subsidiaries located in high-tax jurisdictions are financed by subsidiaries located 
in low-tax jurisdictions. The interest on the debt paid by the subsidiary in the high-tax 
jurisdiction reduces the taxable profits reported in that jurisdiction, while the interest 
income registered in the low-tax jurisdiction is taxed at a very low rate – or is not taxed 
at all.
3 The anatomy and geographical dispersion of corporate groups
Over the last couple of decades, the operational and legal–financial fragmentation of 
the TNC has resulted in a transformation of the large firm from a functionally diverse, 
but legally and jurisdictionally contained enterprise to a multi-subsidiary corporate 
group, in which different functions are fulfilled by specific subsidiaries that often exist 
3 Data on Special Financial Institutions from De Nederlandsche Bank.
4 Cost-contribution agreements are contracts in which two entities agree to contribute financially 
toward the development or production of an asset or the execution of a service. In exchange 
for their financial contribution, parties to the contract receive a proportionate share of the eco-
nomic benefits arising from the asset or service.
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as separate legal entities in different jurisdictions. A typical TNC, or corporate group,5 
nowadays has dozens, if not hundreds of subsidiaries, each of which fulfills a specific 
role in the broader scheme of the corporate group6 (see, for example, Figure 1, which 
shows the dispersion across countries and sectors of the subsidiaries of a representa-
tive TNC). Although the constellation and specific functions of individual subsidiar-
ies are idiosyncratic and unique for each corporate group, for analytical purposes we 
distinguish between five broad types of subsidiaries. These are manufacturing affiliates; 
shared service centers; R&D facilities; top holding companies; and intermediate holding 
companies. Below, we discuss for each of these types of subsidiaries the kinds of activi-
ties they engage in, their specific function in the broader scheme of the corporate group, 
the macro-institutional arrangements and tax incentives that can be expected to attract 
these types of activities, and the employment and tax benefits that countries can expect 
to receive from the hosting of such subsidiaries.
Manufacturing affiliates
A first type of subsidiary is the manufacturing affiliate. Beginning in the 1960s, and in-
creasingly so with the gradual abandonment of international trade and capital barriers 
in the 1980s and 1990s, TNCs began to outsource and relocate parts of their manufac-
turing operations to foreign locales. Initially, such relocations primarily involved the 
most routine and labor-intensive of TNCs’ manufacturing operations and were driven 
above all by a search for labor cost advantages (Lewin and Peeters 2006). Over time, 
however, TNCs increasingly began to relocate more complex tasks and have moved 
beyond cost savings to consider such things as worker skills, infrastructure, and govern-
ment trade and investment policies (Ellram, Tate, and Petersen 2013).
In addition to the benefit of low labor costs and other institutional factors, manufactur-
ing affiliates often make use of special regimes available in the new host country. Such 
“special economic zones” typically offer a combination of tax and tariff incentives and 
may even exclude firms operating in those zones from labor, environmental, and own-
ership regulations that apply to firms operating elsewhere in the country (Farole and 
Akinci 2011).
Manufacturing activities are typically the most labor-intensive subsidiaries of a cor-
porate group. So when a TNC relocates parts of its manufacturing operations abroad, 
this is generally believed to have significant and beneficial employment-creating effects 
5 Throughout this paper we use the terms “transnational corporation” (TNC), “multinational,” 
and “corporate group” interchangeably.
6 The function may even be so specific that it pertains only to a particular transaction and a 
limited period of time. If such subsidiaries are not dissolved after their specific purpose has dis-
sipated, this may, over time, result in them becoming obsolete; an artefact of the past.
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in the manufacturing sector of the new host country (Harrison and Rodríguez-Clare 
2010). Moreover, the offshoring of manufacturing operations by a lead firm in a partic-
ular global supply chain may also give a significant boost to the non-exporting segment 
of the manufacturing sector in the new host country as local suppliers flock around the 
lead firms’ production operations (Berger 2005), potentially giving rise to the emer-
gence of manufacturing, or industrial, clusters (Fan and Scott 2003).
Shared service centers
A second cluster of group subsidiaries consists of shared service centers. These are sub-
sidiaries that provide centralized support services to other group entities. This may in-
volve both low value-adding back-office operations, such as information technology, 
human resource management, and accounting, as well as higher value-adding services, 
such as procurement, marketing, sales and distribution. Some firms have opted for an 
outsourcing strategy, in which specific services (mostly the lower value-adding back-
office operations) are provided by a third-party service provider. A trend in recent years, 
however, has been for TNCs to centralize and “in-source” some or all business sup-
port activities and have them performed by a captive entity (Lewin and Peeters 2006; 
Bondarouk 2014).7 This entity, known as a “shared service center” (SSC), then provides 
the services to other group entities. Such an SSC may serve the entire corporate group 
or selected group entities operating in a specific geographical region or line of business.
Two considerations may lie behind the establishment of SSCs. The first is cost reduction. 
SSCs allow corporate groups to benefit from economies of scale and avoid duplication 
of services across subsidiaries. Moreover, when located in jurisdictions that provide 
inexpensive labor, the establishment of SSCs can result in substantial savings on labor 
costs (Lewin and Peeters 2006). An increasingly important driver for the growing use of 
SSCs, however, is a desire to source new organizational capabilities (Lewin and Peeters 
2006). TNCs increasingly discover that offshoring technical, professional, and adminis-
trative activities allows them to tap into new pools of highly qualified staff (Lewin and 
Volberda 2011).8 Regardless of which of these considerations prevails, the successful 
implementation of SSCs relies heavily on the availability of good transportation and 
ICT infrastructure and the availability of an English-speaking workforce (Doh, Bun-
yaratavej, and Hahn 2009). Taxes, on the other hand, appear to play only a secondary 
role in TNCs’ decisions where to locate their SSCs. A survey conducted by manage-
ment consulting firm Deloitte amongst 311 large firms that had established over 1,000 
SSCs found that 70 percent of companies do not take taxation into consideration when 
7 See also, https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/dk/Documents/finance/SSC-Hand-
book-%20Hit-the-Road.pdf.
8 See also, https://www.pwc.de/de/finanzdienstleistungen/assets/pwc_studie_financial_shared_
service_centers.pdf.
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choosing the location of their SSCs. We expect that this might be partly explained by 
the fact that SSCs are often run as cost, rather than profit centers and thus make little or 
no taxable profits. Still, 17 percent of companies setting up SSCs do so with the objec-
tive to reduce their global tax burden – for instance through transfer pricing strategies.9
The benefits countries receive from hosting SSCs come primarily in the form of job cre-
ation. This may be effectuated in two ways. First, SSCs can be large employers in the 
service sector of a country’s economy. The previously mentioned Deloitte survey10 found 
that 43 percent of the SSCs in their sample employed more than 100 people, with 15 
percent employing more than 500 people. SSCs may also contribute to job creation in 
a more indirect way. The establishment of SSCs in a particular country may provide a 
boost to the domestic services sector in that country, thereby contributing to job creation 
in the sector, or attract large multinational business service firms to a country. Moreover, 
since SSCs “sell” their services to group entities located in other countries, host countries 
see their services exports increase and their current account balance strengthened.
Research and development (R&D) facilities
A third cluster of group subsidiaries consists of TNCs’ R&D facilities. These are subsid-
iaries that are responsible for TNCs’ product innovations. Although up until the 1990s 
these activities used to be performed in the context and proximity of TNCs’ global 
headquarters (Patel and Pavitt 1991), increasingly TNCs are relocating them across ju-
risdictions (Dachs, Stehrer, and Zahradnik 2014).
Existing literature identifies three main motives underlying the internationalization of 
TNCs’ R&D activities (Carlsson 2006). The first is for TNCs to adapt the design and 
development of their goods and services to the specific needs of local markets (Fors 
and Zejan 1996). This is typically done for markets that are especially important for a 
firm’s sales figures. Another motive for the relocation of R&D facilities is to bring them 
in closer proximity to TNC’s previously offshored manufacturing operations. Finally, a 
third, and increasingly prominent, motive underlying the relocation of R&D activities 
away from TNCs’ home country is a desire to establish a presence in highly innovative 
regions and cities (Florida 1997). TNCs relocating their R&D activities to such regions 
do so to get access to local talent and knowledge. Important considerations taken into 
account by TNCs seeking to tap into local innovative capacities are the availability of 
highly qualified personnel and a high density of universities and other types of research 
9 For example, Starbucks’ centralized procurement SSC, located in the Netherlands, played an 
important role in the tax planning strategy the company had adopted in order to minimize the 
tax burden on its European operations (Kleinbard 2013).
10 https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/dk/Documents/finance/Deloitte-SSSurvey-
Interactive.pdf
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institutions (Dachs, Stehrer, and Zahradnik 2014; Cantwell and Piscitello 2002). The 
cost of R&D personnel appears to be of only minor importance in the R&D location 
decision (Dachs, Stehrer, and Zahradnik 2014). Instead, TNCs value countries, and re-
gions within countries, that provide for attractive living conditions that make it easy to 
attract additional knowledge workers from abroad (Malecki 1987).
Although there appears to be consensus in the literature that macro-institutional fac-
tors dominate TNCs’ R&D offshoring decisions, tax incentives are said to play a role 
as well (Cantwell and Mudambi 2000; Hines 1994). Tax incentives for R&D activities 
may involve tax credits for R&D expenditures or so-called patent or innovation boxes, 
whereby income emanating from qualifying intellectual property assets is taxed at a re-
duced rate (Evers, Miller, and Spengel 2015). Especially the latter type of incentive has 
become widely used in Europe over the last decade. As of June 2017, fourteen European 
jurisdictions had introduced some form of innovation box.11 Moreover, to attract for-
eign high-skilled workers, and thus increase their attractiveness as a location for TNCs’ 
R&D activities, some jurisdictions have implemented temporary tax reductions for per-
sonal income taxes for foreign knowledge workers.
When it comes to the potential benefits that host countries might reap from the re-
location of R&D activities, discussions in the literature tend to focus on the promise 
of knowledge spillovers and productivity gains (Hejazi and Safarian 1999; Saggi 2002; 
Kim and Park 2017). However, research on the policy strategies that governments adopt 
to attract FDI in R&D suggests that national investment promotion agencies consider 
the quantity and quality of jobs created as some of the most important factors in their 
evaluation of potential R&D investment projects (Guimón 2009).
Top holding companies
The fourth cluster of group subsidiaries we identify are top holding companies. Top 
holding companies are companies that appear at the apex of a corporate group’s owner-
ship structure and therefore are often referred to as the group’s “global ultimate owner” 
(GUO). These entities play a key role in the legal–financial organization of the group. 
The location of the top holding company generally determines the legal home of a cor-
porate group and thereby not only the company law under which it operates, but in 
many cases also its tax residency.12 Since a large fraction of profits are typically trans-
ferred to the top holding company, the tax residency of that company plays a key role in 
11 These are Belgium, Cyprus, France, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Malta, 
the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, the canton of Nidwalden in Switzerland, and the UK (Chen et 
al. 2017).
12 Not all tax systems determine an entity’s tax residency by its place of incorporation. Some juris-
dictions determine tax residency by the place of management, or a combination of both place of 
incorporation and place of management.
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the consolidated tax rate of the group (Dischinger, Knoll, and Riedel 2014). For publicly 
listed TNCs, the top holding company is also the legal entity whose shares are traded on 
a stock exchange and thus administers the group’s relationship with its external share-
holders. This means that the tax regime of the jurisdiction in which the top holding is 
domiciled determines how dividend payments to shareholders are taxed.
Not all top holdings, however, are the same. The traditional top holding company would 
be domiciled in the jurisdiction from which the group originated and not only fulfill a 
key role in the legal–financial organization of the corporate group, but also act as the 
group’s global headquarters and thus perform most or all of the corporate functions re-
sponsible for the orchestration of the group’s global value chains: strategic management, 
shared services, and compliance and reporting (Baaij et al. 2015). In today’s fragmented 
TNC, these functions are increasingly unbundled and relocated to jurisdictions that 
provide the optimal conditions for the performance of those specific functions (Desai 
2009; Baaij et al. 2015). Examples of traditional headquarter functions that TNCs may 
detach from their top holding and relocate across borders are the staff function (result-
ing in the establishment of SSCs), the group financing and treasury function (resulting 
in group financing companies – see next subsection), and the strategic management 
function (resulting in divisional and regional headquarters – see next subsection).
Given the impact of the tax regime that applies to a top holding on the overall tax bur-
den of a corporate group, TNCs have significant incentives to transfer their top holding 
to a jurisdiction with low corporate income tax rates and/or more favorable legislation 
(Baaij et al. 2015; Voget 2011). In the period 1997–2007, 6 percent of all multinationals 
relocated their headquarters to another jurisdiction by means of corporate inversions or 
mergers with a foreign firm (Voget 2011). Over 50 percent of US multinationals that relo-
cated their headquarters to another jurisdiction by means of corporate inversions in the 
period 1990 to 2016 did so to countries with no corporate income tax – mainly the Cay-
man Islands, Bermuda, and the British Virgin Islands (Slangen, Baaij, and Valboni 2017). 
Transferring the top holding to another jurisdiction may have other non-tax-related ben-
efits as well. For instance, it has been suggested that top holding relocations may enable 
TNCs to improve communication and knowledge exchange with investors (Birkinshaw 
et al. 2006), and give them access to new pools of managerial talent (Baaij et al. 2015).
The benefits that countries receive from hosting top holding companies thus very much 
depend on the scope of the activities performed by the top holding. When a top holding 
company only serves as legal seat, but carries out few or no real activities, then benefits 
for the host country come almost exclusively in the form of increased revenues from 
corporate taxes and incorporation fees.13 If, on the other hand, a top holding company 
13 The host country may also benefit from indirect forms of employment creation. The legal and 
financial reporting obligations that come with the maintenance of top holding companies pro-
vide work for the offshore services sector (i. e., trust firms, tax advice, legal advice, etc.) in the 
host country.
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carries out some or all of the traditional corporate headquarter functions, substantial 
employment benefits for the host country can be expected. Global headquarter func-
tions are associated with high-quality jobs, and can potentially give rise to agglomera-
tion effects and result in significant knowledge spillovers (Davis and Henderson 2008).
Intermediate holding companies
These are holding companies that may appear anywhere under the top holding in a 
corporate group’s ownership structure. Intermediate holding companies appear in dif-
ferent forms and may be used for a number of purposes. One such a purpose is the 
tax-efficient channeling of the value that is created by operating subsidiaries to the par-
ent company. To achieve this, debt or equity investments made by the parent company 
are not made directly into a foreign subsidiary, but indirectly through an intermedi-
ate holding company, or “conduit” entity. Returns made on those investments are then 
channeled back to the parent company through the conduit entity in the form of inter-
est or dividend payments. Intermediate holdings may also be used for the channeling of 
royalty payments. Such “royalty conduits” may receive royalty payments because they 
are the legal owner of an intellectual property asset itself or because they own the eco-
nomic rights to the royalty income generated by the asset due to a licensing agreement 
with the group entity that legally owns the asset (Maine and Nguyen 2017). The above 
described dividend, interest, and royalty conduit functions may also be combined in a 
single intermediate holding company.
The archetypical intermediate holding company is one that has few employees and plays 
only a minor role in managing and directing group activities. This may be different, 
however, in the case of intermediate holding companies that combine pure holding 
activities (i. e., the holding and administering of assets, be they financial, tangible, or in-
tangible assets) with strategic, coordinating, or capital management functions. The best 
example of such multifunctional intermediate holding companies are regional head-
quarters. Regional headquarters are typically designed to both hold the equity capital 
of operational subsidiaries active in the relevant region and to engage in strategic deci-
sion-making and coordinating functions regarding the TNC’s activities in that region. 
It is also not uncommon for a regional headquarters to accommodate a shared service 
center offering business support services to operating subsidiaries in that specific re-
gion. Another example is the group financing company, sometimes also referred to as 
the group’s treasury. These are entities that are responsible for the management of intra-
group financial transactions, such as intragroup lending, group liquidity management, 
hedging, and other financial operations that had traditionally been part of the finance 
function of the corporate headquarter.
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A number of institutional features can make a jurisdiction an especially attractive loca-
tion for the establishment of intermediate holding companies and/or regional headquar-
ters. One is the availability of the institutional infrastructure necessary to support inter-
mediate holding companies: a stable and efficient state apparatus, sufficiently advanced 
ICT infrastructure, and the availability of knowledgeable tax advisors, trust firms, and 
other types of business services (Wójcik 2013; Eicke 2009). For group treasuries, having 
access to deep and developed capital markets may represent an important consider-
ation (Eicke 2009). Perhaps even more important for TNCs’ decisions where to locate 
their intermediate holding companies, however, are the specificities of a jurisdiction’s 
tax regime. One such specificity is the absence of withholding taxes on outgoing and 
incoming dividend, interest, and royalty payments, or the availability of reduced rates 
on such payments. Typically, therefore, intermediate holding companies are located in 
jurisdictions that provide TNCs with access to an extensive network of bilateral tax trea-
ties, enabling them to significantly reduce the tax costs of funneling payments through 
a specific jurisdiction (Weyzig 2013). Other aspects of a country’s tax regime that TNCs 
may consider in the location decision for their intermediate holding companies are the 
administrative burden created by tax compliance and the existence and enforcement of 
anti-avoidance provisions. Finally, the availability of investment treaties with countries 
in which an envisioned holding company’s subsidiaries are located may further increase 
the attractiveness of a jurisdiction as a location for an intermediate holding company.
From a country perspective, the benefits that come with the hosting of intermediate 
holding companies depend very much on the extent to which these companies are pure 
conduit entities or engage in a broader scope of activities. For intermediate holding 
companies that act as pure conduit entities, the benefits should primarily be looked for 
in additional tax revenues and indirect employment effects. Effective tax rates on the 
dividends, interests, and royalties that flow through these entities may be minimal, but 
because of the sheer size of these flows, they may generate substantial tax revenues for 
the host country nevertheless. In the case of the Netherlands, for instance, financial flows 
through intermediate conduits of 4 trillion euros (five times the size of the country’s 
GDP) contribute an estimated 3 to 3.4 billion euros in taxes, salaries, and services hired 
(Kerste et al. 2013; van den Berg et al. 2008). Conduit entities themselves employ few 
employees, but the establishment and maintenance of intermediate holding companies 
requires the services of local corporate service providers (i. e., notaries, trust firms, tax 
advisors, lawyers, etc.) and thus has an employment-creating effect in those sectors. This 
is different, however, when the intermediate holding company also serves as a regional 
headquarter. In this case, the intermediate holding company might employ substantial 
numbers of employees and contribute significantly to a country’s services exports.
The representation of the anatomy of the contemporary firm sketched in the previous 
paragraphs is, of course, a highly stylized one. Explicitly distinguishing between FDI 
in these five different types of operations does, however, provide a degree of analytical 
traction that has been missing in previous analyses of international tax competition. In 
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the ensuing analysis we exploit this analytical traction to develop a more sophisticated 
understanding of tax competition between EU member states. Specifically, we answer 
three simple questions: Which EU countries attract which types of FDI? What institu-
tional and tax arrangements do they use to do so? And what are the benefits they receive 
from doing so in terms of tax revenues and employment creation?
4 Analytical approach, data, and visualization
Analytical approach
To answer these questions we conducted a two-step analysis. In a first step we deter-
mined for each of the five categories of FDI identified in Section three which EU mem-
ber states14 are most successful in attracting those activities. Because the available data 
on FDI does not distinguish between the different types of investment projects that are 
financed by the FDI flows, we constructed a set of indicators that gauge the intensity of 
the economic phenomena and activities associated with each type of FDI. Throughout 
the remainder of the paper we denote these indicators as activity indicators.
In a second step we looked at a range of macro-institutional and tax and policy indicators 
to understand which macro-institutional features and tax policies are associated with 
those countries that are most successful in attracting the different categories of FDI. For 
example, we assume low labor costs and low corporate income tax rates to be associated 
with countries that are successful at attracting manufacturing affiliates, while we as-
sume the availability of low withholding taxes to be associated with countries successful 
at attracting intermediate holding companies.
The motivations for our indicators and the exact operationalization of each indicator 
can be found in Table S1 and Section S5 in the online Appendix, which is available at 
https://osf.io/7xwtb/.
Data
To construct our indicators we use a combination of macro (country-level) and micro 
(firm-level) statistics. Macro statistics were collected from Eurostat, the World Input-
Output Database, World Bank Open Data, the International Bureau of Fiscal Docu-
14 The unit of analysis is all countries covered by the Interest and Royalty Directive (2003/49/EC) 
and the Parent-Subsidiary Directive (2003/123/EC) – i. e., countries from the European Union 
and Switzerland.
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mentation, and UNCTADstat. Since we obtain the majority of our indicators from Eu-
rostat, we generally lack data on Switzerland. Micro statistics were collected from the 
Orbis database. Orbis collects information on over 250 million public and private firms 
worldwide from official country registrars and other country collection agencies, and it 
is a frequently used source of data (Vitali, Glattfelder, and Battiston 2011; Johannesen, 
Tørsløv, and Wier 2016; Garcia-Bernardo et al. 2017) that offers good coverage for EU 
firms (Garcia-Bernardo and Takes 2017). All indicators were calculated as the mean 
value for the period 2007–2017, or a subset of the period when data was not available for 
all years. For a complete description of all the indicators, including sources, time data 
availability, and descriptive statistics, see Tables S1–S6 in the online Appendix as well as 
the Supplementary Methods section there. In order to ensure replicability and cumula-
tive knowledge-building, all our indicators and Python code are available at https://osf.
io/7xwtb/ under public license Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0.
Clustering analysis and visualization of the results
Normalization
Our visualization strategy assigns a color to a numerical value, where blue corresponds 
to low values and red corresponds to high values. Using the same matching between 
colors and numerical values in all variables would be infeasible since the range of our 
variables varies by several orders of magnitude. While the average tax rate of multina-
tionals is 0.18 (±15 0.07), the average time to complete and submit taxes is 192.2 (± 99) 
days. In order to visualize the results effectively, we need to normalize all variables so 
that they lie in the same range. A common normalization strategy (StandardScaler) is 
to subtract the mean and divide by the standard deviation, which standardizes all vari-
ables to have mean equal to zero and standard deviation equal to one. However, this 
strategy does not make it possible to visualize outliers – such as Malta with an FDI stock 
sixteen times the size of its GDP – while also making the differences between the rest of 
the observations visible. Instead, we use another normalization strategy (RobustScaler) 
where we subtract the median and divide by the interquartile range – the range between 
the 1st quartile (25th percentile) and the 3rd quartile (75th percentile; Figure 2A). Fig-
ure 2B visualizes the data on FDI flows in 2017 (Figure S2 in the online Appendix) us-
ing both RobustScaler and StandardScaler. When using RobustScaler we are able to see 
both the outliers (Malta and Cyprus) and countries attracting high FDI stocks (Belgium 
or Netherlands) in red, while for the StandardScaler strategy only the outliers are visible. 
15 Across the paper, we use (± x) to show one standard deviation.
16 MPIfG Discussion Paper 19/9
Clustering
We use the activity indicators to identify countries that compete for a specific category 
of FDI. We make use of a clustering algorithm to guide our interpretation of the results. 
The clustering algorithm calculates the distance between two countries based on the 
differences between all activity indicators. For instance, in Figure 2B there are two vari-
ables (RobustScaler and StandardScaler). There is a small distance between two coun-
tries if they have similar values for both variables. The algorithm then constructs a tree, 
where countries appear in adjacent branches if the distance between them is small – e. g. 
Cyprus and Malta, or Luxembourg, Ireland, Switzerland, Netherlands, and Belgium.
To arrange countries into groups, many different clustering algorithms can be used. 
Each of these techniques uses its own distance formulas, and thus yields different re-
sults. In order to avoid cherry-picking a clustering technique that produces “meaning-
ful” results, we apply the default algorithm and use the results only as a starting point, 
on the basis of which we then cluster the countries manually. The initial clustering is 
provided in Figure S3 in the online Appendix. A detailed explanation of the clustering 
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Figure 2 Visualization of our results
(A) Example of the interquartile range (IQR) and the color scheme used through the analysis. 
(B) Example of the FDI stock by country using two normalization strategies. Note that the 





Garcia-Bernardo, Reurink: Competing with Whom? 17
Country summaries
We summarized how successful countries are at attracting each category of FDI by us-
ing the sum of all normalized activity indicators, separating low and high value-adding 
activities (see Section S4 in the online Appendix). In order to compare the European 
countries amongst each other, the success of each country was then normalized again 
using the method from the section above (Normalization).
5 Results
Manufacturing affiliates
We first identified those countries that attract disproportionate amounts of TNCs’ man-
ufacturing affiliates. We found a prominent cluster of countries composed of Romania, 
Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Malta, and Bulgaria (Figure 3A). 
All these countries engage primarily in low value-adding manufacturing activities in 
which they show high levels of wage-adjusted productivity. Moreover, this cluster of 
countries receives greenfield investment flows in the manufacturing sector of 2.0 per-
cent (±0.8 percent) of their GDP, which contrasts with the 0.4 percent (±0.3 percent) 
received by all other countries.16 There is, however, a broad distinction within this clus-
ter between those countries in which a large fraction of the labor force is employed in 
foreign-owned companies in the manufacturing sector and those for which this frac-
tion is much smaller (Figure 3B). In Malta, Romania, Estonia, Hungary, Slovakia, and 
the Czech Republic the number is 6.9 percent (±1.8), whereas for Poland and Bulgaria 
it is 3.7 percent (±0.5 percent). For the latter group of countries, however, a number 
of factors might partly explain these relatively low numbers. For Poland, the country’s 
large population size has a significant downward effect on the percentage of the labor 
force employed by foreign firms. The raw number of jobs created in that country, how-
ever, is 680,000, considerably higher than the numbers for countries of similar size, such 
as Spain and Italy (386,000 and 429,000 respectively). For Bulgaria, the size of green-
field investment suggests that a future increase in the number of jobs in foreign-owned 
manufacturing operations can be expected.
16 Three countries (Lithuania, Latvia, and Croatia) receive relatively large greenfield FDI flows (0.9 
percent ±0.4 percent). However, given their small size and the fact that only a small fraction of 
their labor force is employed in foreign-owned companies in the manufacturing sector, we do 
not consider them as countries that attract disproportionate numbers of manufacturing affili-
ates.
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We next moved to the macro-institutional and tax arrangements associated with the 
countries previously identified (Figure 3C). As anticipated, since we assume cost re-
ductions to be the primary motivation for the offshoring of manufacturing operations, 
all countries previously identified score low on all macro-institutional indicators when 















































































































































































































































































































Figure 3 Manufacturing affiliates
Number of IQRs from the median
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(A) Activity indicators, (B) benefits, and (C) macro-institutional features and tax incentives associated with attracting 
manufacturing affiliates. The identified clusters of countries is marked with a gray bracket (A, C) and different shades of 
orange (B). Countries are sorted according to their assigned cluster. See Table S1 in the online Appendix for a complete 
explanation of the indicators.
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Romania and Bulgaria. These countries’ exceptionally low labor costs may be an im-
portant factor in explaining why since 2007, the year they joined the European Union, 
these countries have been the largest recipients of greenfield FDI in manufacturing ac-
tivities. Regarding the tax indicators (which in Figure 3C are separated from the macro-
institutional indicators by a thin white line), we see that all the identified countries 
have corporate income tax rates that are significantly lower than those for most other 
European countries, with the notable exceptions of Ireland and Cyprus. They also all 
stand out both in terms of the number of tax incentives targeted specifically to invest-
ments in manufacturing activities and in terms of the low levels of withholding taxes 
that they levy on outbound dividend payments. We also observe that all countries that 
attract manufacturing affiliates, except Slovakia and the Czech Republic, had signed 
large numbers of investment treaties, but not tax treaties, with Western Europe before 
they entered the European Union. This suggests that withholding tax considerations are 
secondary to the securing of property rights in TNCs’ decisions where to locate their 
offshored manufacturing activities.
Shared service centers
We next identified countries that are competing for TNCs’ SSCs. Here we identified 
three clusters of countries that successfully do so (Figure 4A). All countries in those 
three clusters (with the notable exceptions of Poland and Bulgaria, which we will dis-
cuss below), see a relatively large fraction of their labor force employed in foreign-
owned SSCs. The first cluster, consisting of the Netherlands, Ireland, United Kingdom, 
and Luxembourg, attracts high value-adding SSC activities, has high wage-adjusted 
productivity, and receives large amounts of greenfield investments in SSC activities. 
The second cluster, composed of Finland, Austria, Belgium, and Sweden, also attracts 
high value-adding SSC activities but shows lower wage-adjusted productivity and also 
somewhat lower levels of greenfield investment in SSCs. We interpret this difference as 
the second cluster being somewhat less attractive as a location for TNCs’ high value-
adding SSC operations and therefore attracting fewer such operations. The third cluster, 
composed of Poland, Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Portugal, and 
Estonia, is characterized by low value-adding activities but high levels of adjusted pro-
ductivity. In this third cluster, foreign-owned SSCs employ 1.3 percent (±0.5 percent) of 
the labor force, compared to 4.1 percent (±4.7 percent) and 1.7 percent (±0.3) for the 
first and second clusters respectively (Figure 4B). However, Bulgaria receives the second 
highest flows of greenfield FDI and we thus expect employment numbers to increase in 
the following years. In the case of Poland, the large size of its labor force causes a down-
ward bias in the share of the labor force employed in foreign-owned SSCs. In fact, the 
raw number of workers in foreign-owned SSCs in Poland (372,000) is two to four times 
higher than the number for Romania (183,000), Portugal (107,000), Czech Republic 
(102,000), and Hungary (78,000).
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Looking at the macro-institutional and tax policies associated with the countries in 
those three clusters (Figure 4B), we make the following observations. High value-add-
ing SSC activities (first and second clusters) take place in countries that combine high 












































































































































































































































































0 1 2 3
% country
































Figure 4 Shared service centers
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(A) Activity indicators, (B) benefits, and (C) macro-institutional features and tax incentives associated with attracting 
shared service centers. The three identified clusters of countries are marked with gray brackets (A, C) and different shades 
of orange (B). Countries are sorted according to their assigned cluster. See Table S1 in the online Appendix for a complete 
explanation of the indicators.
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contrary is true for low value-adding activities (third cluster). Similar to the manufac-
turing case, tax considerations appear to be secondary to macro-institutional deter-
minants in TNCs’ decisions where to locate their SSC activities. We assume this to be 
a result of the fact that most SSCs are run as cost centers and therefore do not make 
substantial amounts of taxable profits.
Research and development (R&D) facilities
Thirdly, we identified countries that successfully attract R&D facilities of TNCs. We 
found two clusters of such countries (Figure 5A). The first consists of a heterogeneous 
group of highly developed countries. All countries in this cluster have a large R&D 
sector, evidenced by the large share of their labor force employed in corporate R&D 
facilities and the large numbers of patent applications by both domestic and foreign 
firms. Moreover, these countries all display high levels of R&D expenditure financed 
from abroad, which indicates that a significant proportion of R&D operations in those 
countries is conducted by foreign-owned firms. This is further confirmed by the fact 
that, corrected for the size of their economies, these countries show high numbers of 
patent applications by foreign-owned companies. Three countries within this cluster 
(Belgium, Ireland, and the United Kingdom) distinguish themselves from the others in 
that foreign-owned firms account for 42–45 percent of all patent applications in those 
countries – compared with 16–31 percent in the rest of the cluster. The second cluster 
consists of Hungary, Bulgaria, and the Czech Republic. Compared to the first cluster, 
R&D takes a much less prominent role in these countries’ economies, as evidenced by 
the much lower fraction of their labor forces employed in R&D operations as well as 
the low number of patent applications by domestic firms (Figure 5B). They do, however, 
receive high levels of foreign R&D expenditure, suggesting that foreign firms see them 
as suitable locations for their offshored R&D activities nevertheless.
To get a deeper understanding of the differences between the two clusters, we then 
looked at the macro-institutional and tax features of these countries. For the first clus-
ter of highly developed countries, fluency in English, ICT infrastructure, graduates in 
science and technology, and quality of life closely correlate with foreign-owned R&D 
activities (Figure 5C). This was expected, since TNCs operate R&D facilities in those 
countries where the skills are located. The top three countries by foreign R&D invest-
ment (Austria, Switzerland, and Finland) rank 4th, 2nd, and 3rd for quality of life and 
6th, 3rd, and 2nd for graduates in science and technology. For the second cluster of 
countries, low labor costs appear to dominate over other indicators. Most likely, the 
fact that these countries see comparably large amounts of their total R&D expenditures 
come from foreign-owned companies and a large percentage of their domestic patent 
applications come from foreign-owned companies as well, is due to the prominent pres-
ence of foreign-owned manufacturing activities in those countries. As explained in Sec-
tion three, one motivation for TNCs to relocate some of their R&D activities is to have 
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them in the proximity of their already offshored manufacturing operations. Finally we 
found that R&D incentives (with the notable exception of the patent box) are correlated 
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Figure 5 R&D facilities
A CB
(A) Activity indicators, (B) benefits, and (C) macro-institutional features and tax incentives associated with attracting R&D 
facilities.The two identified clusters of countries are marked with gray brackets (A, C) and different shades of orange. 
Countries are sorted according to their assigned cluster. See Table S1 in the online Appendix for a complete explanation 
of the indicators.
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or Denmark) that offer only a small number of R&D incentives but nevertheless attract 
high levels of foreign R&D investments. This indicates that tax considerations play only 
a secondary role to the availability of talent in those countries.
Top holding companies
We identified three clusters of countries that appear successful in attracting TNCs’ top 
holding companies (Figure 6A). The first cluster is composed of the three smallest EU 
member states: Cyprus, Luxembourg, and Malta. The second is composed of Ireland, 
Switzerland, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and Austria.17 Countries in all three 
clusters attract disproportionate amounts of top holding companies, but countries in 
the first cluster attract the highest numbers relative to the sizes of their GDPs. Coun-
tries in the first cluster also seem to enjoy the most significant benefits from hosting 
top holdings, at least as far as tax revenues are concerned. They raise tax revenues of 
5.4 percent (±0.3 percent) of their GDP from corporations, compared with 2.5 percent 
(±0.5 percent) in other European countries (Figure 6B). The main difference between 
the first and the other two clusters concerns the profit rate of foreign firms (Figure 
6A). The profit rate in the first cluster is 511,000 (±230,000) €/employee,18 significantly 
higher than the profit rates in the second cluster (59,000 ±28,000 €/employee), the third 
cluster (58,000 ±7,530 €/employee) and all other countries (69,000 ±38,000€/employee). 
Furthermore, the three clusters differ from each other in terms of their differential score 
on the difference in profit rates between multinational and domestic companies. For the 
first cluster this difference stands at 135,000 (±187,000) €/employee, for the second at 
17,000 (±23,000) €/employee, and for the third at –59,000 (±36,000) €/employee. For all 
other countries this difference stands at –58,000 (±44,000) €/employee.
A more complete picture of the differences between the countries in the three clusters 
appears when their scores on the macro-institutional and tax indicators are considered 
(Figure 6C). Most importantly, the effective tax rates (ETRs) for countries in the first 
cluster are significantly lower than those for countries in the second and third clusters, 
with the exception of Ireland. We find the median ETR for companies with revenues 
higher than one million dollars to be 3.9 percent in Luxembourg, 9.8 percent in Cyprus, 
28.0 percent in Malta, and 20.6 percent (±6.0 percent) in all other European countries. 
In the Maltese case, however, the effective tax rate excludes an up to six-sevenths re-
17 Arguably, with a strong presence of the Big Four, a high number of GUOs and high profit rates, 
Denmark would also be a candidate for this group. However, we decided to exclude it for two 
reasons. First, the comparatively low value of equity assets held by companies in that coun-
try suggests that Denmark primarily harbors top holdings of rather small and inconsequential 
TNCs. Second, the low profit rates when compared with domestic companies suggest that the 
relatively high number of GUOs in Denmark has little to do with TNCs’ tax planning strategies.
18 Assuming an employee cost of 100,000 US dollars across countries.
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fund to shareholders on the tax paid. Including this refund in the calculation would 
bring the ETR down to 4–8 percent. Moreover, the low ETRs that multinationals pay in 
these countries do not necessarily apply to domestic companies. We found that the tax 
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Figure 6 Top holdings
A CB
(A) Activity indicators, (B) benefits, and (C) macro-institutional features and tax incentives associated with attracting top 
holdings. The three identified clusters of countries are marked with gray brackets (A, C) and different shades of orange. 
Countries are sorted according to their assigned cluster. See Table S1 in the online Appendix for a complete explanation 
of the indicators.
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lower than the tax paid by their domestic counterparts. We interpret our finding that 
countries in the first cluster combine low effective tax rates with relatively high profit 
rates of multinationals, and above those of domestic companies, as an indication that 
TNCs locate their top holdings in those countries primarily for reasons of tax planning. 
Countries in the second and third clusters, with lower profit rates of multinationals, 
larger economies, a higher score on the governance indicator, and higher effective tax 
rates for multinationals, seem to be able to attract a larger fraction of top holdings that 
are not exclusively motivated by tax planning considerations, meaning, for example, 
actual global or regional headquarters. Another difference between the three clusters 
concerns the absence of an extensive network of tax treaties in the first cluster. We 
interpret the apparent unwillingness of countries to sign tax treaties with countries in 
the first cluster as another indication that TNCs locate their top holdings in Cyprus, 
Malta, and Luxembourg mainly to reduce their tax burden. For countries in the second 
and third clusters, on the other hand, we interpret their ability to sign tax treaties with 
large numbers of countries as an indication that the top holdings located in those coun-
tries are perceived as more legitimate by potential treaty partners. Finally, our results 
further suggest that countries may increase their attractiveness as a location for TNCs’ 
top holding companies by offering low withholding taxes on dividends and providing 
lenient and efficient tax legislation (low number of anti-avoidance provisions and short 
time needed to prepare taxes).19
Intermediate holding companies
Lastly, we identified three clusters of countries that successfully attract intermediate 
holding companies, or conduits (Figure 7A). The first cluster is composed of Hungary, 
Malta, and Cyprus. Countries in this cluster are all specialized in one type of intermedi-
ate holding company. Cyprus operates as a pure dividend conduit, as evidenced by its 
high value of conduit investment. Hungary and Malta attract disproportionally large 
payments for the use of intellectual property, reflecting their status as preferred juris-
dictions for royalty conduits. The second cluster is composed of a prominent group of 
multipurpose countries: Luxembourg, Netherlands, Switzerland, Ireland, Belgium, and 
the United Kingdom. All countries in this group exhibit high values for all types of 
holding activities. For the case of the United Kingdom, its large GDP – 3.4 times higher 
than the second largest country in the cluster – downplays the importance of the coun-
19 Estonia is worthy of special mention. It appears to have all the right conditions to be identi-
fied as a top holding jurisdiction – a small economy, lenient and efficient tax legislation, mini-
mal taxation. It also harbors a large number of small top holdings. However, the low scores of 
the country on most other activity indicators suggest that the country may be attracting large 
amounts of top holdings of small and inconsequential TNCs (possibly related to personal fi-
nance and wealth management) but does not play a significant role as a preferred jurisdiction 
for top holdings of bigger TNCs.
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try as a conduit jurisdiction. The third cluster we identified consists of four countries 
that attract moderate amounts of holding companies: Finland, Sweden, Austria, and 
Denmark. Countries in this group are frequently used as dividend conduits, and oc-
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Figure 7 Intermediate holdings
A CB
(A) Activity indicators, (B) benefits, and (C) macro-institutional features and tax incentives associated with attracting 
intermediate holdings. The two identified clusters of countries are marked with gray brackets (A, C) and different shades 
of orange. Countries are sorted according to their assigned cluster. See Table S1 in the online Appendix for a complete 
explanation of the indicators.
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We next analyzed the macro-institutional indicators correlated with the clusters (Figure 
7C). We found that countries in the second and third clusters have good governance, a 
highly developed ICT and financial infrastructure, and a large presence of the Big Four. 
Contrary, countries in the first cluster exhibit comparatively lower levels of governance 
and infrastructure (at levels similar to those of Spain and France), which suggest that 
tax determinants may be the key to their success. Indeed, we found that all three coun-
tries have no withholding taxes, a low number of anti-avoidance provisions, and the 
most generous patent boxes in Europe. The patent box in Hungary (established in 2003) 
offers a tax rate of 5 percent on qualifying royalty income, the Maltese patent box (es-
tablished in 2010) provides a full exemption for all qualifying royalty income, and the 
Cyprus patent box (established in 2013) offers an 80 percent exemption in gross profits 
(tax rate below 2.5 percent).
The second cluster of countries is also characterized by the presence of a generous pat-
ent box, and either the presence of the notional interest deduction or another tax in-
centive targeting group interest payments. The high correlation between the patent box 
score and the success to attract royalty holdings indicates that royalty holdings (but not 
R&D activities) are attracted to places with generous patent boxes, which is consistent 
with the literature on patent location (Evers, Miller, and Spengel 2015; Karkinsky and 
Riedel 2012). Moreover, the correlation between the presence of measures granting spe-
cial tax treatment for interest income and the loans held by non-financial corporations 
in a country indicates that interest holdings may be attracted to places with generous 
interest incentives. Further, countries in this group have either no or low withhold-
ing taxes (Luxembourg and the Netherlands), or an extensive network of tax treaties 
(Switzerland, Belgium, United Kingdom). The only exception is Ireland, with moderate 
withholding taxes and a relatively shallow network of tax treaties. However, withhold-
ing taxes in Ireland can be avoided by using a holding company in a third EU country 
that has an extensive network of tax treaties, since intragroup payments in the EU are 
exempt from withholding taxes. Countries in this second cluster also have a large net-
work of investment treaties, ensuring investor rights and increasing the attractiveness of 
a country for dividend holdings. Finally, countries in the third cluster are characterized 
by the highest levels of governance, reduced regulation and incentives, evidenced by the 
lack of anti-avoidance provisions and interest incentives.
Towards a typology of “FDI attraction profiles”
To summarize and wrap up the results of our analysis we then profiled all countries ac-
cording to the different types of FDI they attract. We identified six groups of countries 
(Figure 8), each of which we indicated with a unique color mark in the bar just above 
the country labels. One group of countries (indicated with the white color mark) con-
sists of a heterogeneous set of large and small countries (Germany, France, Slovenia, 
Spain, Italy, Greece, Latvia, Croatia, and Lithuania) that all appear to be rather unsuc-
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cessful in attracting FDI of any category. Countries in each of the other five groups all 
successfully attract distinct combinations of two or more categories of FDI. We call 
these distinct combinations FDI attraction profiles. Below we briefly discuss each of 
these profiles in more detail.
The FDI attraction profile that is marked in gray, and which is associated with Hungary, 
the Czech Republic, Bulgaria, Romania, Slovakia, and Poland, revolves primarily around 
TNCs’ offshoring of manufacturing activities. For this reason, we dubbed countries as-
sociated with this profile manufacturing centers. Apart from manufacturing activities, all 
countries in this group attract at least some degree of (primarily low value-adding) SSC 
activities. It is conceivable that this particular combination of manufacturing and low 
value-adding SSC FDI is the result of a sequential phenomenon in which TNCs first 
offshore their manufacturing operations to those countries and, after having had good 
experiences with the country’s investment climate, decide to also relocate some of their 
lower value-adding SSCs to the country. After all, in decisions regarding SSC (re)loca-
tions that are primarily motivated by cost reductions TNCs seem to consider location 
factors that are very similar to those that are considered in decisions regarding the (re)
location of manufacturing activities. Such a pattern of “sequential FDI” has indeed been 
identified in the international business literature as a mechanism that might explain 
TNCs’ location decisions when offshoring activities (Oman 2000; Kogut 1983). Two of 
the countries associated with the manufacturing centers profile (the Czech Republic and 
Hungary) also attract a small amount of R&D activities. As we suggested earlier, this may 
be an artefact of TNCs’ preference to have some of their R&D activities located in the 
proximity of their previously offshored manufacturing operations. Hungary is a special 
case in this group of countries because it has also been able to attract substantial numbers 
of intermediate holding companies due to its aggressive tax incentives (see Section five).
The second FDI attraction profile, which is associated with Portugal and Estonia, com-
bines low value-adding SSC activities with a limited amount of high value-adding SSC 
activities. We refer to countries associated with this profile as back-office centers. The 
reason these countries are successful in attracting SSCs may lie in their unique macro-
institutional features. Both countries combine low labor costs with an efficient work-
force and above-average ICT infrastructure. Their success in attracting top holding 
companies, however, probably has more to do with the specificities of their corporate 
tax regimes. Estonia only taxes corporate income once it is distributed to shareholders, 
which is an attractive regime for small individually-owned companies, while Portugal 
harbors within its borders the Madeira international business center, where no with-
holding taxes are levied and which offers a statutory tax rate of only 5 percent.
The third FDI attraction profile, which we label innovation centers, is associated with 
Sweden, Denmark, Finland, and Austria (marked in yellow). The main strength of these 
countries is their ability to attract TNCs’ R&D affiliates. We attribute these countries’ 
success in doing so primarily to their macro-institutional features. All countries of-
fer large numbers of STEM graduates, good ICT infrastructure, and a stable political 
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climate. Interestingly, none of these countries seems to rely on exceptionally generous 
patent boxes or other kinds of tax incentives to be successful in attracting TNCs’ R&D 
facilities. Apart from the FDI in R&D, most of these countries also attract a consider-
able number of intermediate and top holdings. The attraction of holdings is correlated 
with good access to financial markets, and the presence of a stable government provid-
ing efficient regulation.
The fourth FDI attraction profile that we identified is without doubt the most encom-
passing one. This profile (indicated in blue) combines all categories of FDI except for 
manufacturing activities. However, what is unique about the countries associated with 
this profile is their ability to attract high value-adding SSCs and intermediate holding 
companies. Because of the central role of these two functions in the coordination of 
global value and wealth chains, we dubbed this the coordination centers profile. This 
unique combination of activities is partly explained by these countries’ macro-institu-
tional endowments. All countries in this group provide for a highly skilled workforce, 
good infrastructure, and a stable political climate. However, tax incentives appear to 
play a significant role as well. Most of these countries provide for low withholding tax-
es and tax incentives specifically created to attract holding companies, such as patent 







































































































































































































Figure 8 Summary of the results
>2
Number of IQRs from the median
Median
<–2 –1.6 1.6–0.8 0 0.8
Countries’ ability to attract different categories of FDI. Red cells correspond to highly successful, blue 
cells correspond to highly unsuccessful. Colored boxes indicate the five FDI-attraction profiles identi-
fied: Profit centers (green), Coordination centers (blue), Innovation centers (yellow), Back-office 
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for the emergence of this particular FDI attraction profile should be looked for in the 
proactive role of the offshore services sector in shaping tax and financial regulatory 
policies in these countries (Dörry 2016). Although this hardly confirms our expecta-
tion, all countries associated with the coordination profile display an exceptionally high 
presence of the Big Four accounting firms (see Figure 7C).
We labelled the fifth and final FDI attraction profile the profit centers profile. The two 
countries associated with this profile (Cyprus and Malta) primarily attract top holding 
companies, but also, to a somewhat lesser extent, intermediate holding companies. The 
extraordinarily high profit rates of multinationals that we found for those two coun-
tries indicate that the top holdings they attract are mainly of the sort that are used for 
profit-shifting purposes, rather than those that engage in substantial global headquarter 
activities. We thus conclude that these countries owe their status as a preferred location 
for top holdings almost exclusively to the specificities of their tax regimes. Taking into 
account Malta’s special tax refund scheme, both countries have effective tax rates that 
are amongst the lowest in the EU. The centrality of such low effective tax rates means 
that the profit center profile can only be a feasible FDI attraction profile for countries 
with very small domestic economies. This is because in such countries the additional 
tax revenues generated by taxing the activities of intermediate holding companies more 
than offset the reduction in tax revenues from domestic companies.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we have created a more sophisticated understanding of the variegated na-
ture of international tax competition for FDI. To do so we first traced the great fragmen-
tation of the firm to distinguish between five different categories of FDI: manufacturing 
affiliates, shared service centers, R&D facilities, intermediate holding companies (con-
duits) and top holding companies (sinks). By using a combination of micro and macro 
statistics, we were able to show for each category of FDI which European countries are 
most successful in attracting it and what benefits they obtain from doing so. We also 
looked at a range of macro-institutional and tax indicators to show which policy mea-
sures countries have implemented to attract these specific categories of FDI. Finally, we 
summarized our findings by profiling countries according to the different types of FDI 
they attract. In this way, we were able to identify five distinct groups of countries, each 
of which attracts a distinct combination of categories of FDI. We called these distinct 
combinations FDI attraction profiles and labelled the five FDI attraction profiles that we 
found to exist in the European Union manufacturing centers, back-office centers, innova-
tion centers, coordination centers, and profit centers.
Three important lessons can be learned from our results. The first of these pertains to 
our understanding of the broader phenomenon of tax competition. Contrary to the 
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prevailing assumption that tax competition for FDI is a monolithic force that pits small 
countries against big ones, our results suggest that, empirically, specific countries ap-
pear to compete for specific types of FDI and use specific types of tax policies to do so. 
Tax competition thus takes place amongst subsets of countries that compete for similar 
categories of FDI. This insight has important implications for policy initiatives at the 
EU level that aim to curb aggressive tax competition. Tax policy-making in the EU is a 
highly politicized affair. Direct taxation is one of the few policy fields in which individ-
ual member states have successfully defended their sovereignty. As a result, any attempt 
to question the legitimacy of a specific tax incentive or instrument tends to run up 
against opposition from those member states that rely on that incentive or instrument 
to attract internationally mobile FDI. Given the variegated nature of tax competition, 
we should not expect smaller member states to invariably be united in their attempts to 
block attempts orchestrated at the EU level to question the legitimacy of a specific tax 
incentives or instrument. Rather, we should expect member states to alternately side 
with or oppose ad hoc coalitions of countries, large or small, that initiate attacks on 
specific tax measures and instruments. Advocacy groups, international organizations, 
and even the European Commission would be wise to take the existence of such flexible 
coalitions into account when formulating policy proposals aimed at curbing the harm-
ful aspects of international tax competition.
A second lesson that can be drawn from our results has to do with potential unintended 
consequences of policy initiatives aimed at curbing the harmful effects of international 
tax competition. The goal of the Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) project, a ma-
jor anti-tax avoidance initiative currently carried out under the auspices of the OECD 
(OECD 2015), is to move TNCs to align economic substance (i. e., sales, assets, and em-
ployees) with value creation (i. e., profits). However, if one takes seriously the fragment-
ed nature of today’s TNC, one soon realizes that TNCs can easily create the minimally 
required economic substance in those countries where they choose to book their profits, 
for example, by adding shared service center activities to their (intermediate) holding 
companies. This might, in fact, reinforce, rather than bring a halt to international tax 
competition. Indeed, the overlap that we found in our analysis between countries at-
tracting shared service centers and intermediate holding companies suggests that this 
is already being done.
A third lesson that can be drawn from our results goes beyond the phenomenon of tax 
competition and speaks to debates about national varieties of capitalism (VoC). The 
existence of distinct FDI attraction profiles and their embeddedness in countries’ in-
stitutions of economic governance, we argue, challenges conventional ways of thinking 
about national varieties of capitalism in two ways. First it challenges the (implicit) as-
sumption that the institutional complementarities that underpin national varieties of 
capitalism are an inherently national phenomenon. At least some of the institutional 
complementarities that underpin FDI attraction models have a strong inter/transna-
tional component. Consider, for example, the reliance of innovation and coordination 
centers on regionally integrated labor markets in order to attract sufficient numbers of 
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high-skilled workers from other countries in the region. Second, it confronts conven-
tional approaches to VoC with a phenomenon that has thus far not been sufficiently 
theorized. That is the phenomenon that FDI attraction profiles, and the national variet-
ies they are embedded in, are themselves complementary to each other.20
The analysis presented in this paper has a number of limitations and thus opens up sev-
eral avenues for future research. We see three of them as especially fruitful. The first of 
these would be to extend the analysis presented in this paper to other parts of the world. 
In this regard, the Asia-Pacific region seems to be an especially suitable candidate. A 
process of regional economic integration in some ways resembling that in the European 
Union has been underway in that region since the mid-1980s under the auspices of the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the Asia-Pacific Economic Co-
operation (APEC). For firms operating in that region, this has opened up the possibility 
to organize their corporate structures and processes on a regional rather than national 
basis. Indeed, jurisdictions like Singapore and Hong Kong are known to be domiciles 
for large numbers of holding companies and regional headquarters, making it at least 
conceivable that they fulfill a role in that region that is not unlike the one played by the 
coordination centers we found in the EU. Whether the region also harbors the other 
FDI attraction profiles we identified in this article is an open question.
Another limitation of our analysis that could be addressed in future research is that we 
have focused primarily on non-financial firms. Yet financial firms (banking conglomer-
ates, investment funds, insurance firms) have gone through a similar process of frag-
mentation. The emergence of multipurpose financial services firms and the unbundling 
of front- and back-office operations in those firms have since the 1990s resulted in a 
geographical dispersion of the financial firm that is very similar to the one experienced 
by non-financial firms. A typical investment fund nowadays is domiciled in Luxem-
bourg or the Cayman Islands, the fund manager sits in London, while the back-office 
paperwork is done in Dublin. International competition for each of these activities is as 
fierce for financial TNCs as it is for non-financial ones (Fernandez 2016).
Finally, future studies could build on the analytical framework laid out in this article 
to contribute to debates about national varieties of capitalism (Soskice and Hall 2001) 
and growth models (Baccaro and Pontusson 2016; Hope and Soskice 2016) in the field 
of comparative political economy. In this regard, the development of more sophisticat-
ed indicators to measure, for example, fixed capital formation and the development of 
wages in countries with different FDI attraction profiles, would give better insights into 
the benefits that countries attain from the FDI they receive. Moreover, (comparative) 
case studies of national FDI attraction models could address some of the limitations 
of the current macro approach. For example, our analysis is not able to explain why, 
despite similarities in their macro-institutional features and tax incentives, Slovenia is 
not able to attract high levels of FDI, while Hungary, Estonia, Poland, Romania, the 
20 For exceptions to this see Lane (2008); Nölke and Vleigenthart (2009).
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Czech Republic, and Slovakia are. Such research could also look at the specific historical 
and political conjuncture in which these models emerged and unveil the institutional 
specificities and historical contingencies that helped to shape individual and collective 
preferences of actors or that otherwise might have had an impact on the evolution of 
national FDI attraction models.
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